Introduction -Employment Protection Legislation Measurement
The flexibility of the labour market can be viewed from numerous aspects: wage flexibility, functional flexibility, internal numerical and external numerical flexibility, geographical and occupational mobility or adaptability of knowledge and skills ( Figure 1 ). External numerical flexibility refers to limits and ability of firms to hire and dismiss workers. Employment protection legislation (EPL) refers to the legal norms and procedures which regulate this field (Arandarenko, 2011a, p: 163) . One of the main goals of the EPL is to ensure security for workers, particularly in case of redundancy (Amine, 2015) . The main source of employment protection regulations is the Labour Law, but these rules can also be defined in collective agreements and individual labour contracts. EPL is one of the important elements of the labour market flexibility on the macroeconomic level.
Numerical measurement of employment protection legislation is a relatively complex task, due to a large number of legal norms that are often difficult to express numerically. In order to provide a numerical measurement of employment protection legislation, OECD has defined EPL index and accompanying sub-in-dices. Calculation of the EPL index is based on 21 basic items that refer to: a) protection of regular (permanent) workers against individual and collective dismissal and b) regulation of temporary forms of employment. In line with that, the aggregate EPL index consists of three main sub-indicators: 1) sub-index for the regular (permanent) contracts when individual dismissals are concerned (EPR), 2) sub-index which relates to the additional limitations for collective dismissals (EPC) and 3) sub-index for temporary contracts (EPT). EPRC is a sub-index which is also quite often used and refers to the protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals. It represents the weighted average of EPR and EPC sub-indices. The EPL index and other sub-indices take values from 0 to 6, where higher scores indicate stricter regimes. For more details on EPL index construction, see Appendix. The use of this index is associated with some shortcomings:
• Legal provisions refer only to employees in the formal sector of the economy. In the countries having a significant share of the shadow economy, the labour market flexibility in this sense is de facto higher than the EPL index indicates.
• In many countries, certain groups of companies or employees, or even economy sectors, are exempted from EPL provisions or they are susceptible to certain changed legal provisions. These are mostly: small firms, participants in active labour market policies, apprentices or workers undertaking training, older workers, disabled persons, etc. (Venn, 2009 ). EPL often does not cover or it just partially covers certain forms of employment. e.g., self-employed and seasonal employees. EPL coverage varies significantly across countries and a "failure to account for it may lead to overestimating the importance of EPL, with this overestimation being especially large in lower-income countries" (Aleksynska & Eberlein, 2016 ).
• Not all changes in employment protection legislation are reflected in the change of the EPL index. This can be caused by either a small change in legislation that is insufficient to modify the numerical scores which are the basis of the calculation of the EPL index, or by the fact that some aspects of the legislation are not taken into account in the calculation of the index (European Commision, 2016, p. 37).
• Certain aspects regarding the implementation of the legal norms are not included in the index. If the application of the legal norms is inadequate, the indicators which are based on the legal provisions do not give the real picture of the general employment protection legislation, which was especially noticeable during the transition process (Table 1) . Myant & Brandhuber (2016, p. 11) state that variation in labour law enforcement is an important issue, since the "abuses of employment law, at least in some countries, are widespread, making formal legal protections of questionable value to substantial parts of their labour forces". According to Verkerke & Benoit (2017) , some of the limitations of these indices refer to the insufficiency of practical information about enforcement, coverage and ease of law avoidance, with the additional problem being the implicit assumption that EPL applies to the whole labour market.
EPL covers only formal workers whose labour is observed by the state (World Bank, 2018). Although EPL is one of the possible triggers to higher informal economy (Fialova & Schneider, 2014 ; Arsic, Arandarenko, Radulovic, Randjelovic, & Jankovic, 2015), other authors emphasize that when enforcement of labour pro-tection policies is reasonably strict, employers have incentives to employ workers formally so as not to face penalties (Florez & Perales, 2016 (2005) was measured by the size of the informal economy -the higher the informal economy, the weaker is the estimated degree of enforcement. Authors used data on the informal economy from Schneider & Klinglmair (2004) , complemented with different country studies.
In this paper, we use a similar approach: we modify the original EPL index by the share of informal economy in GDP, as an approximation of the degree of employment protection legislation enforcement.
A clearer picture about the real influence of certain sub-indices of the employment protection legislation can be obtained if we also take into consideration the share of workers with regular contracts in total employment, since the system of calculation of the EPL index is such that the sub-index EPRC which refers to the workers with permanent contracts has the largest weight: suggested was that there was a possibility that, in spite of the existence of the legal solutions which provide employment protection legislation in accordance to the average of EU countries, these regulations were not adhered to completely, which in reality increased this type of flexibility of labour market. A similar situation is found in Brazil, where, in spite of the strict labour regulation, there was a surprisingly large level of flexibility, which might be the consequence of low enforcement (Almeida & Carneiro, 2012) . Besides, more recent studies have found that "non-application of labour law was asserted to be a major cause of precarious work in many countries", especially in the CEE and Mediterranean clusters (Prosser, 2016, p. 955 ).
The real influence of the employment protection legislation in countries which have a significant rate of noncompliance with the law is quite hard to capture, but it is certain that in such conditions the real value of EPL is lower. The aim of this paper is to find the ranks of the countries based on the indices adjusted to the share of the shadow economy and the share of employed with standard contracts.
Methodology and Data
For international comparison of employment protection legislation, we use the latest official OECD data on the EPL index and its sub-indices: EPR, EPC, EPRC and EPT (2012 to 2015, depending on the country data availability). However, the OECD data for Serbia show the values for EPR, EPC and EPRC indices, while the value of EPT sub-index is missing. Therefore, it is not possible to calculate the value of the overall EPL index.
According to the OECD methodology, the EPT index is calculated on the basis of the following items, presented in Table 2 : . The adjusted indices reflect both de iure strictness of EPL (i.e., the legal strictness of regulations) and its coverage. If de iure strictness is high, but the coverage is low, then de facto strictness of labour regulation is low. For total EPL index, the measure of coverage is informality -the higher informal sector is, the lower effective coverage of labour regulation will be, and de facto EPL strictness is lower, which will be reflected in the lower values of adjusted EPL index (i.e. KEPL).
The adjusted KEPL index represents EPL index which has been modified by the shadow economy share in GDP (which is denoted as SHE in equations (1) - (3)).
KEPL = EPL * (1-SHE)
The shadow economy and informal labour markets are "closely connected" (Fialova & Schneider, 2014) . Informality is more frequent in emerging countries where it is "mostly associated with sub-standard labour conditions", but it is also an important concern for more advanced economies (Di Porto, Elia, & Tealdi, 2017). Theoretically, if the share of the shadow economy is zero, KEPL will equal EPL. The higher the share of the shadow economy, the difference between KEPL and EPL will be larger. If SHE is 100%, KEPL index will be zero, which would point to infinite external numerical labour market flexibility (no regulation would be implemented in practice).
If regulation for regular contracts is too strict, firms may start to rely more on the temporary contract. If the share of employees with temporary contracts is high, the coverage of labour regulation for regular contracts is lower. In the calculation of the EPL index, the weight of EPR component is high. However, if the effective coverage of this part of labour regulation is low, then de facto strictness is also lower. Adjusted EPR and EPRC indices (i.e., KEPR and KEPRC) show de iure strictness of this part of labour regulation adjusted by the coverage of this regulation. If informality is high and/or the share of employees with standard contracts is low, then the de facto strictness of EPR and EPRC will be lower, and KEPR and KEPRC indices will also have lower values.
The adjusted EPR and EPRC indices take into account both the size of the informal sector and the share of employees with regular contracts in a total number of employed persons. The modified KEPR index is calculated when the standard EPR index is multiplied by the share of employees with the regular contracts in total employment and then by the share of the shadow economy. A lower share of employees with permanent contracts in total employment will reduce KEPR and KEPRC indices in comparison to their original values, and therefore indicate higher flexibility. 
KEPR = EPR * PCE * (1-SHE)
KEPRC = EPRC * PCE * (1-SHE)(2)
Results and Discussion

Cross-country comparison of employment protection legislation according to unadjusted indices
In the first step, we calculate the EPT sub-index for Serbia, which allows us to compute the total EPL index. EPT sub-index has two components: EPFTC, which refers to regulation on fixed-term contracts and EPTWA which shows the rigidity of the legal framework that regulates temporary agency work. In order to assign numerical scores necessary to calculate the EPFTC sub-index, we have answered the questions 1-3 in Table  2 . The Labour Law does not regulate temporary agency work, and the law that should cover this area is still in preparation. While there are provisions that regulate establishing and functioning of employment placement agencies (with main activity being an intermediary between labour demand and supply), the temporary agency work in the current legal environment exists, but the rules that regulate it more closely are still not defined.
Therefore, in line with the current legal provisions, in all the questions related to TWA, the most flexible solutions were taken into the calculation of the EPTWA sub-index, which is consistent with the functioning of TWA in practice.
With the obtained numerical scores for EPFTC and EPTWA and the weights given in the OECD methodology of the EPL computation, the value of EPT in Serbia is 2.04. Details on the methodology of assigning numerical scores and the weighting system are presented in Appendix (A.2. and A.3).
With the values of EPR and EPC given in the OECD database (Table 3) , and the weights defined by the OECD (OECD, 2013):
EPL=7/12*EPRC+5/12*EPT, the final value of the total EPL index for Serbia is 2.15. 
Relative position of Serbia based on adjusted EPL indices
If we take into consideration the share of the employed with permanent contracts and estimated share of the shadow economy in the GDP, the ranking position of certain countries regarding the strictness of EPL changes significantly. The assumption is that in the countries with a higher share of the shadow economy in GDP, the share of employed who are not covered by the employment protection legislation provisions is proportionally higher, as well as the general degree of non-compliance with the legal norms. Modification of EPR and EPRC indices takes also into account the share of employed with standard contracts in total employment, who the regulation concerning EPR and EPRC indices refers to.
The difference between the original and modified indices, which is a consequence of taking into account the shadow economy, is in negative correlation with the value of the indicator of the World Economic Forum The protection of the property rights. This indicator is used as the approximate measure of (dis)respect of the law in a given country, while higher values point at the greater respect of property rights. It should be noted that there is a negative correlation between the values of this indicator and the share of the shadow economy in GDP (Pearson's coefficient of the correlation is -0.798). On average, in countries with higher perception of protection of property rights, the share of the shadow economy is smaller, as well as the difference between original and modified EPL index. It points only to the changes in rankings. i.e., to the change in a position relative to the other countries, when the adjusted indicator is taken into account. A lower rank indicates a higher flexibility. Therefore, negative values (rankKEPL < rankEPL) mean that the ranking based on the adjusted indices is lower than with the original ones. In that case, a relative de facto flexibility (compared to other countries) is higher than the relative de iure flexibility measured by original indices. Differences in rankings based on the original and adjusted EPL index arise from the fact that in countries with high share of the grey economy, regulations are more often disregarded, which artificially reduces the prescribed legal protection of employment.
Country rankings based on standard and adjusted indices do not vary greatly on average: the correlation coefficient between ranks based on EPL and KEPL indices is 0.82. Similarly, the correlation coefficient of country rankings based on EPRC and KEPRC is 0.67 and 0.83 between EPR and KEPR rankings. Venn (2009) has shown that, in the group of all OECD countries, the ranking of countries is insensitive to weight changes in the calculation of the index, as well as to the introduction of weights based on the share of employees with temporary and fixed-term contracts (the coefficient of correlation for the standard EPL index and EPL index weighted by the structure of employees with different types of contracts is 0.95; Venn, 2009, p. 13) . However, as shown in Figure 5 , in a number of countries there are major changes in ranks. A significant change in the ranking towards greater flexibility compared to other countries, based on differences between EPL and KEPL, is present in Estonia, Lithuania, Croatia, Greece, Latvia and Serbia. A significant difference in rank is defined as a difference greater than 3 in absolute terms. Differences in rankings that occurred after adjusting the EPR and EPRC indices, besides the shares of the grey economy, also stem from the structure of employment. EPR and EPRC indices have a large influence on the final EPL index, due to the weighting system proposed by OECD. However, if the proportion of workers that are subject to these regulations (i.e., workers with permanent contracts) is small, the real influence of EPR on labour market rigidity is much weaker. Therefore, we have adjusted EPR and EPRC indices by the share of workers with unlimited contracts in the total employment. With the adjusted EPR and EPRC indices, countries with a smaller share of workers with permanent contracts have lower adjusted indices, which points to larger de facto flexibility in comparison to other countries. In the context of international comparisons, the real rigidity of the employment protection legislation in Serbia is lower than when viewed only on the basis of original indices which are based on legal regulations. In recent years, indicators that reflect the state of the regulation show a move towards greater flexibility -the value of the EPL index has decreased in comparison with the beginning of 2014. The amendments to the Labour Law of 2014 were to a large extent aimed at reducing the rigidity of employment protection legislation, which resulted in a decrease in the value of this index. In addition, the so-called "hidden rigidities", which did not affect the value of the EPL index, but in practice represented additional restrictions for the dismissal of employees, were removed. One example is the method of calculating redundancy payments, which was the source of the highest number of criticisms of the old legal solutions with arguments that in this way the potential discrimination of employment of persons with many years of work experience was encouraged (Arandarenko, 2011b). 
Conslusion
The OECD's EPL Index is most commonly used for international comparisons of employment protection legislation. One of the shortcomings of this index stems from the fact that in countries with a significant share of the grey economy, the labour market flexibility is de facto higher than the index shows, since the legal provisions apply only to employees in the formal part of the economy. If the application of legal norms is inadequate, indicators based on legal regulations do not give a realistic picture of the employment protection legislation. Also, recent studies show that results of the empirical research focused on the economic consequences of labour regulation differ if indicators based on de facto situation are used instead of the usual, de iure indicators. However, studies that use de facto indicators are still very rare, since it is often hard to capture the level of the law enforcement. The calculation of adjusted indicators of EPL in this paper is based on the methodology originally developed in previous research conducted by Berger The adjusted EPL index is corrected by the share of the shadow economy in GDP, while the adjusted EPR and EPRC indices also take into account the share of workers with permanent contracts. The corrected KEPL, KEPR and KEPRC indices represent an approximation of the de facto employment protection legislation, since, apart from the employment structure, through the correction by the share of the grey economy, the occurrence of non-compliance with legal norms is also taken into account to a certain extent. A Forthcoming more significant change in the ranking towards greater flexibility (compared to other countries) based on the differences between EPL and KEPL is present in: Estonia, Lithuania, Croatia, Greece, Latvia and Serbia. On the other hand, the differences in the ranking achieved by adjusting the EPR and EPRC indices, are also derived from the structure of the employment. In all cases, in the context of international comparisons, the real flexibility of employment protection legislation in Serbia is higher than when viewed only on the basis of original indices which are based on legal regulations. Although labour market flexibility can bring benefits to labour market functioning, this type of easing employment protection legislation, obtained by the relatively high incidence of non-compliance with the legal norms (approximated by the share of shadow economy) is not an optimum way to gain more flexibility, since it is associated with high legal insecurity. The method presented in the paper is able to give information of the relative position of a country in terms of strictness of labour regulation. In order to get more accurate measures, more sophisticated methods should be used. Since literature on de facto measures of the EPL is still rather scarce, this is an important avenue for further research.
